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A CALL TO REWRITE AMERICA'S CHILD PORNOGRPAHY TEST: THE DOST
TEST

I. INTRODUCTION

Children are perhaps America's most precious, yet vulnerable, members of society.
Their innocence and naivety leave many susceptible to the clutches of pedophiles, who wish to
exploit children for their own perversions. As a result, Congress enacted strict laws to shield
children from sexual exploitation and to prosecute those responsible for such atrocities. Holding
to a higher standard of censorship, the Supreme Court ruled in Miller v. California,
"Pornography depicting children... may be proscribed whether or not the images 'taken as a
whole' appeal to 'prurient interests' or 'have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value. "' 1 Despite the Court's ruling in Miller in 1973, prior to 1977 Congress had yet to enact
any federal statute prohibiting the use of children in the production of sexually explicit
materials. 2 Recognizing that children were being exploited for pornography and suffering harm,
Congress enacted the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act in May of 1977
under 18 U.S.C. § 2251. 3 Notwithstanding the inaction of the Protection of Children Against
Sexual Exploitation Act by Congress, child pornography remains pervasive throughout the
United States. In fact, child pornography is currently a billion dollar industry. 4

1

James E. Bristol, Free Expression In Motion Pictures: Childhood Sexuality and a Satisfied Society, 25
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 333, 342 (2007), quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973).
2
/d.; SeeS. Rep. 95-438 at I. Act became law under P.L. 95-225 (1978) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§2251-2252, 2256 (1994 & Sup. IV 1998)).
3
See Id; 18 U.S.C. § 2251.
4
Allison L. Cochran, Punishment for Virtual Pornography ... It's Just a Fantasy, 2 (Oct. 2009).
(unpublished comment, on file with BePress), available at http://works.bepress.com/allison_cochran/1.
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Congress's failure to eradicate child pornography is attributable to the inconsistent
applications of anti child pornography laws including § 2251. Under § 2251, a person who
employs or entices any minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the depiction of such
conduct is in violation of the law. 5 18 U.S.C. § 2256 defines the term "sexually explicit" as the
lascivious exhibition of the genital region. 6 Today, several circuits use a non-exhaustive totality
of the circumstances test known as the Dost Factor Test to determine if lasciviousness is present,
and thus, if there is a presence of sexually explicit conduct. 7 However, United States v. Johnson
exposes the discrepancies between district courts and circuit courts in applying anti child
pornography standards. 8
In this case, a weightlifting coach filmed his minor weightlifters in the nude. 9 Both the
district court and circuit court applied the Dost Factor test to determine the presence of

°

lasciviousness in the videos. 1 Focusing on each video's content, the Honorable Richard E. Dorr
of the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri held the videos of each
minor depicted only mere nudity, not lasciviousness or sexual explicitness. 11 Thus, Scott A.
Johnson did not violate § 2251. 12 However, Judge Hanson of the Eighth Circuit reversed the
district court's decision, finding Mr. Johnson guilty of violating § 2251 by filming child
pornography. 13 The Eighth Circuit noted that even though some of the videos showed only
nudity, the intent of Mr. Johnson and the context in which the images were created violated §

5

18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) 2012.
18 u.s.c. § 2256(2) 2012.
7
United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, (S.D. Cal. 1986).
8
See generally United States v. Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (W.D. Mo. 2010); United States v.
Johnson, 639 F.3d 433,438 (8th Cir. 2011).
9
See Johnson, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 1089.
10 see z'd.
11
See id.; Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 828.
12
See id.
13
See Johnson, 639 F.3d at 438; 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).
6
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While some scholars embrace the current anti child pornography laws, others have
criticized the application of§ 2251 and the Dost Factor Test because of their vague terms, their
contribution to the sexualization of children, and their inconsistent focus upon either the content
or the context of images. First, critics claims the term lascivious, which is used to define child
pornography under § 2251, problematically varies in meaning among the different circuits across
the country. 15 Even more, factors such as "sexually suggestive" and "sexual coyness" found in
the Dost Factor Test, which is used to define lasciviousness under § 2251, are vague and often
reshaped based upon each jury member's unique experiences. 16 Second, critics assert society's
interest in sexualizing children makes it nearly impossible to properly apply the fact sensitive
Dost Factor Test to discern appropriate images of children from pornography. 17 As scholars
Amy Adler and Robert J. Danay advocate, the Dost Factor Test's requirement for courts and
jurors to scrutinize images of naked children only contributes to society's sexual exploitation of
children. 18 Finally, critics claim many federal court decisions have skewed the application of the
Dost Factor Test. As scholar Robert J. Danay explains, Dost Factor Test decisions focusing
solely upon the content of images fail to consider the consequences of images that may seem
fairly innocuous, yet were created by a pedophile with perverse intentions. 19 On the other hand,
critics have also argued a Dost Factor Test centering solely upon the creator's intent allows

14

See id. at 438-39.
See Bristol, supra note I at 353-54.
16
Id. at 355.
17
See id. at 356; Anne Higonnet, The History and Crisis ofIdeal Childhood 133, 153 (1998).
18
Robert J. Danay, The Danger ofFighting Monsters: Addressing the Hidden Harms of Child
Pornography Law 11 REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES 151, 156 (2005); Amy Adler, The Perverse
Law ofChildhood Pornography 101 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 209, 210 (2001).
19
See id. at 157; James R. Kincaid, Erotic Innocence: The Culture of Child Molesting (Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 1998) at 115, (citing Matthew Stadler) L_j [Kincaid].
15
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virtually any image to qualify as child pornography. 20
To resolve these issues, juries, and in the case of bench trials, judges, should be required
to apply a mandatory balance of both content based and context or intent based Dost Factors
during a Dost Factor Test analysis. First, this requirement will deter jurors and judges from
choosing to apply only factors that suit their personal opinions toward the case at hand. This
new heightened requirement will add a greater level of assurance that a lascivious image was
properly proscribed. In addition, this flexible standard will allow the definition of lasciviousness
to be organic and reshape as society's standards change. Finally, this new requirement will allow
courts to form solidified concepts of what types of images constitute lasciviousness and what
types of images do not.
This comment will first explain the meaning and application of § 2251, the Dost Factor
Test, and the different holdings of the district court and court of appeals in United States v.
Johnson. The following section will display the criticisms that plague the Dost Factor Test,

including its vagueness, misapplication, and its unintended promotion of the sexualization of
children. Finally, this comment will offer a resolution, which will allow judges and juries to
continue applying the Dost Factor Test, but require that a balance of both content based and
context based factors be applied during the test's implementation.

II. DECIPHERING 18 U.S.C. § 2251, THE DOST FACTOR TEST, AND THE COURT'S
PROBLEMS IN UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON

A.§ 18 U.S.C. 2251 and Its Helper "The Dost Factor Test"
Congress's concern with the growth of commercial child pornography led to the creation
20

Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. PAL. REv. 921, 957 (2001); United States v.
Moore, 215 F.3d 681, 687 (7th Cir. 2000). The question before the court was whether the photos provided
probable cause for an arrest on child pornography charges.

5
of the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977. 21

Since that time, the

Act has undergone several amendments to strengthen its protection of children in America. 22 In
1984, 1986, and most recently in 1988, Congress expanded the statute's reach by raising the age
of those defined as minors, extending the provision to reach offenders who print and publish
child pornography, and increasing the penalties for conviction. 23 Under the current § 2251
provision, "Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to
engage in ... any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of
such conduct shall be punished as provided under subsection (e). " 24 The question that must be
asked is what constitutes sexually explicit conduct? Under § 2256, sexually explicit conduct is
defined as: sexual intercourse; bestiality; masturbation; sadistic or masochistic abuse; or
lascivious exhibition of the genital or pubic area of a person. 25
Focusing on the final category, while § 2251 nor § 2256 explicitly define the meaning of
the word "lascivious," the Eighth Circuit, Ninth Circuit and Third Circuit, have adopted a
holistic test to assess whether material is lascivious, and thus, sexually explicit under§ 2251. 26
The applicable test originates from the Southern District of California case, United States v.

Dost. 27 Under this test, "Courts consider a non-exhaustive list of factors in determining whether
a depiction meets the category of 'lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area."' 28 Factors
typically considered include: 1) whether the focal point is on the minor's genitals or pubic area;
2) whether the picture's setting is sexually suggestive, i.e. in a place associated with sexual
21

Ralph V. Seep, Validity, Construction, and Application ofPenalizing Sexual Exploitation of Children
18 U.S.C.A. § 2251,99 A.L.R. Fed. 643 sec 2(a).
22
See id.
23 !d.
24
Johnson, 639 F.3d at 438; quoting§ 2256.
25 !d.
26
See Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 832.
27 JJee
("
z'd•
28
Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1094; citing Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 828.
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activity; 3) whether considering the minor's age, the minor is depicted in an unnatural pose or in
inappropriate attire; 4) whether the minor is partially clothed or nude; 5) whether the picture
suggests sexual coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity; 6) whether the picture is
intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer. 29 The decision, whether it be by
judge or jury, is based on a totality of the circumstances, and not all of these factors need be
present to find "a lascivious exhibition of the genital or pubic area. " 30 Having said this, several
courts, including the Eighth Circuit, hold that "Images or exhibitions of female breasts and the
buttocks of either gender are not within the purview of§ 2251(a)." 31

B. Applying the Dost Factor Test to United States v. Johnson
1. Mr. Johnson the Coach or Mr. Johnson the Pedophile?

While the Dost Factor Test serves to define "lascivious" under § 2251, its application in
both the district court and appellate court decisions in United States v. Johnson highlights its
severe deficiencies and indicates its need for restructuring. On December 16, 2009 in the
Western District Court of Missouri, a jury convicted Mr. Johnson of eight counts of attempted
sexual exploitation of a minor- a violation under § 2251(a) and (e). 32 His sentence carried a
minimum of fifteen years in prison. 33 Mr. Johnson served as a weightlifting coach at a
specialized facility for young athletes.

29

34

He had been involved in weightlifting and its

Jd.; citing Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 828 (In the case of United v. Johnson, the court added the additional
factor of whether the picture depicts the minor as a sexual object for the jury to consider.)
30
Steven L. Grasz, Child Pornography and Child Nudity: Why and How States May Constitutionally
Regulate the Production, Possession, and Distribution, ofNude Visual Depictions ofChildren 71 TEMP.
L. REV. 609,622 (1998); Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 832.
31
Johnson, 639 F.3d at 438; see also United States v. Gleich, 397 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2005).
32
Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 109 I; § 2251.
33 Id.
34 Id.
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competitions as both a participant and as a coach for several years. 35 He served as a women's
weightlifting coach at the 2004 Olympic Games and refereed national weightlifting
competitions. 36 In the sport of weightlifting, weightlifters compete in classes based upon body
weight. 37 Weightlifting coaches keep track of a lifter's weight through frequent weigh ins for
competitive events. 38 Prior to a competition each participant stands on a scale and "weighs in" in
either the nude or in underwear. 39 A referee of the same gender conducts the weigh in. 40 On
several occasions, Mr. Johnson told female athletes to ~go into an examination room, completely
disrobe, and weigh themselves. 41 However, the females were unaware that Mr. Johnson had set
up a hidden video camera to film their weigh-ins. 42 The defendant placed the camera between
two shelves, limiting its vertical view, yet providing adequate cover. 43 At least two female
athletes were minors at the time Mr. Johnson filmed them. 44 During the police investigation,
authorities found the videotapes in Mr. Johnson's home.

45

Mr. Johnson confessed to

investigators that he filmed the girls without their knowledge, because he, "just wanted to film
them ... [and] see them naked." 46 A grand jury indicted Mr. Johnson on ten counts of sexual
exploitation of a minor under§ 2251, and only two of these charges were dismissed. 47

35

/d.

36

Johnson, 639 F.3d at 435-36.
/d. at 436.

37

/d.
39 /d.
40 /d.

38

41

Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at I 091.

42
43

/d.

44

!d. at 1092.

/d. at 1091.
/d. at 1092.
46 /d.
47
Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1092.
45
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2. The Videotapes

A thorough analysis of each video taken by Mr. Johnson was conducted, each video
representing a separate violation of § 2251. 48 The first count describes, "The scale faces the
table, such that when a person stands on it, a side view is captured. 49 The minor enters the room,
undresses completely, weighs herself, and redresses." 50 While, this view shielded minor's pubic
region, the video showed the minor from just below her shoulders to her calves."51 Under the
second count, "The scale faces the table. 52 The minor disrobes outside of the camera's view. 53
The minor weighs herself naked, giving the camera a side view from just above her breasts to her
calves." 54 However, the video did not clearly show the minor's pubic area and captured no
frontal nudity.

55

Under the third count, "The scale faces the wall opposite the camera, such that

the camera captures a rear view of the person standing on the scale. 56 The camera's zoom
appears to be increased." 57 While the minor weighed herself naked and the frame showed from
her left buttocks to just below her knee, the image captured no frontal view. 58 Under the fourth
count, even though the victim was completely naked at the time, only a side view was visible.

59

Under the fifth count, not only did Mr. Johnson face the scale toward the table, but he also
enhanced the camera's zoom to a similar degree as the video in count four. 60 Nevertheless, the

48

49
50

51
52

53

See /d.
/d.
/d.
/d.

Id.
Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1092.

/d.
/d.
56 /d.

54

55

57

Id.

58

/d.

59

Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.

60

/d.
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video showed no nudity, but only a female in red workout shorts. 61 Under the sixth count, the
frame showed the scale facing the table. 62 While the minor redressed mostly outside of the
camera's view, the frame showed the nude minor from just above her breasts to her calves. 63 In
addition, the far left side of the frame briefly showed the minor's pubic region. 64 Under the
seventh count, the frame consisted of a side view and showed the minor from her upper back to
her calves. 65 Under the eighth count the scale directly faced the camera. 66 The minor weighed
herself three separate times: once fully clothed, once wearing a bra and underwear, and once
only wearing underwear. 67 The video showed the minor from her shoulders to her calves. 68
The two victims testified that they were both fifteen and sixteen at the time Mr. Johnson
filmed counts one, three, four, five, and eight. 69 In addition, "There was no evidence that Mr.
Johnson had tried to enhance the videos by freeze framing any of the images." 70 While a jury
returned a verdict of guilty, Judge Dorr granted Mr. Johnson's motion for acquittal
notwithstanding the verdict and found that Mr. Johnson had not violated§ 2251 under any of the
counts. 71

3. The Western District Court of Missouri's Refusal to Look Beyond the Four
Comers of the Image
While Judge Dorr of the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri

ld.
ld.
63 ld.
64 !d.
65
Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.
66 !d.

61

62

67

68

/d.
/d.

69
70

Id.

71

See generally id.

/d. at 1096.
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conducted a thorough analysis using the Dost Factor Test to detect lasciviousness, the Judge
chose to focus heavily on each video's content and disregarded Mr. Johnson's sexual intentions.
On December 16, 2009, after analyzing the videos using the Dost Factor Test, the jury returned a
guilty verdict on all eight counts. 72 However on January 15, 2010, Mr. Johnson filed a motion
for acquittal notwithstanding the verdict. 73 The Western District Court of Missouri held,
"Although this Court believes Mr. Johnson's conduct should not go unpunished, the Court finds

§ 225l(a) was not intended to apply to Mr. Johnson's conduct."74 Judge Dorr emphasized the
crime charged against Mr. Johnson is limited specifically to a video depiction of a "lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area. . ." 75 He also turned to the American Heritage
Dictionary's definition of the term "lascivious," which states "of or characterized by lust, lewd,
lecherous." 76 Thus, the district court sided with the majority of courts, who have held that mere
nudity does not constitute the, "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area. "77 Citing
examples of lasciviousness, the district court looked to United States v. Rivera. 78 In this case, the
Second Circuit held a reasonable jury could find images showing a minor female lying naked
with her legs spread and the camera focusing on the pubic area serve to elicit a sexual response
in a viewer, and thus are unquestionably lascivious. 79 The district court also cited United States
v. Horn, where the court held that freeze-framing portions of videotape to expose the pubic areas

of young girls indicates lascivious conduct under the Dost Factor Test. 80 Distinguishing Mr.
Johnson's videos from these cases, Judge Dorr opined the videos contained only mere nudity,
72

Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.
/d.
74
/d. at 1091.
75
/d. at 1093; § 2251.
76
/d. at 1094.
77
Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
78
See United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 2008).
79
/d. at 1095; /d. at 250.
80
/d. at 1096; United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781,789 (8th Cir. 1999).
73
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were not created with any sexual intent, and did not cause any damage to the minors.
In its first point, the district court held the content of the videos taken by Mr. Johnson
constituted only mere nudity. 81 In his reasoning, Judge Dorr stated, "There was no evidence in
this case of freeze framing nor was there evidence that zoom enhancement made the minors'
genitals or pubic area the focus of the depiction."82 Mr. Johnson did not attempt to perfect the
camera's zoom, the camera's placement, or the scale's placement to make the minors' pubic area
the focal point of the video. 83 In addition, Judge Dorr remained unconvinced that a video
showing a nude female from her lower back to just below her knees was meant to target the
minor's pubic area. 84 Finally, Judge Dorr highlighted the fact that Mr. Johnson never told the
two girls to pose in a certain way or to wear certain suggestive clothing during the weigh ins. 85
Thus, according to the district court, the videos constituted only mere nudity.
In its second point, the district court determined the videos did not have a sexual intent.
The district court held it was undisputable that these videos depicted two minors taking off their
clothes, stepping onto a scale, getting off the scale, dressing, and leaving the room. 86 However,
Judge Dorr reasoned that by doing precisely what Mr. Johnson asked, the two minors were not
portrayed with the intent of being sexual objects, where the videos would be uploaded to a
website devoted to sexual images. 87 Therefore, the videos were not intended to elicit a sexual
response in viewers any more than mere nudity would elicit.

81

88

Furthermore, Judge Dorr

see z.d•

/d.
/d. at 1096-97.
84
/d. at 1096.

82

83

85

Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1097.

86
87

/d.
/d.; United States v. Wallenfang, 568 F.3d 649, 660 (8th Cir. Iowa 2009). The Eighth Circuit concluded

that a minor was portrayed as a sexual object, because the photographs were primarily sexual in subject
and were placed on a website primarily devoted to sexual images.
88

/d.
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reasoned that, "Regardless of all the Government argument about Mr. Johnson's intent and what
he attempted to gain, it is clear from the end product - the videos - that he failed to actually
produce a visual depiction of a 'lascivious exhibition of the [minors'] genitals or pubic area."' 89
Thus, according to the district court, the videos were not created with a sexual intent.
In its final point, the district court explained the actions of Mr. Johnson did not qualify as
a violation under § 2251, because the minors did not suffer any damages. According to Judge
Dorr, "The females were in an organized weightlifting program, Mr. Johnson was their coach,
and it was undisputed that weighing in the nude was a common practice with weight lifters." 90
Judge Dorr opined that from the viewpoint of the minor females, they were not asked to do
anything unusual. 91 Until the girls realized they had been videotaped, they had no reason to be
upset or damaged. 92 As a result, the district court granted Mr. Johnson' motion for acquittal
notwithstanding the jury's guilty verdict. 93

4. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal's Emphasis on the Intent Over the Content of
the Videotapes
Upon review, Judge Hanson and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found Mr. Johnson
guilty of violating§ 2251 by deemphasizing the videos' contents and stressing the defendant's
sexual intentions. 94 Judge Hanson, writing the opinion for the Eighth Circuit, found the district
court's analysis to be misplaced. 95 First, the Eight Circuit distinguished what images constitute
mere nudity and what images rise to the level of lasciviousness. 96 Judge Hanson reasserted the
district court's point that "More than mere nudity is required before an image can qualify as
89

Johnson, 733 F. Supp. 2d at1093; § 2251.
/d. at 1094.
91
/d. at 1094.
92
/d. at 1094.
93
/d. at 1100.
94
See generally, Johnson, 639 F.3d at 433.
95
/d. at 439.
96
See id at 440.
90
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'lascivious' within the meaning of the statute [§ 2251]."97 However, the Eight Circuit stressed
that lascivious images provide more than just a clinical view of the portions of a child's
anatomy. 98 Relying upon the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Knox, Judge Hanson
explained that surely "[N]o one seriously could think that a Renoir painting of a nude woman or
an innocuous family snapshot of a naked child in the bathtub violates the child pornography
laws." 99
Next, using this distinction between mere nudity and lasciviousness in his Dost Factor
Test analysis of the videos, Judge Hanson and the Eighth Circuit opined that the minors were

°

portrayed as sexual objects. 10

First, Judge Hanson emphasized the camera's focus and zoom

stating a reasonable jury could find that Johnson adjusted the zoom to tighten the focus of the
camera on the area where the females' genitals would be if they had faced the camera, thereby
fulfilling the first Dost Factor. 101 The first Dost Factor asks whether the focal point of the image
is on the minor's genital or pubic area. 102 For example, in at least one video, the camera's focus
has been so "zoomed in" that the left half of the female's body from her left buttock down to her
knee filled half of the screen. 103 Had the female been facing the camera instead of away from it,
the camera would have filmed a close-up view of her naked pubic area. 104 Second, Judge
Hanson opined that a reasonable jury could have concluded that, because the videos show the

97

/d.; United States v. Kemmerling, 285 F.3d 644, 645-46 (8th Cir. 2002).
/d. at 439. See /d. at 646. In United States v. Kemmerling, the court distinguished images of the
genitalia of young males which we labeled as 'lascivious' from those that could be classified as depicting
mere nudity
99
ld; United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 750 (3d Cir. 1994). In United States v. Knox, the Third Circuit
held that a child's genitals need not be fully, or even partially exposed to constitute lasciviousness under
18 u.s.c. § 2256.
100
See id. at 440.
101
Johnson, 639 F.3d at 440.
102
Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 832.
103
/d. at 436-3 7.
98

104

/d.
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girls from their shoulders to their calves, including naked breasts, the facial features of the girls
were of little or no importance to Mr. Johnson. 105 Finally, Judge Hanson indicated that, "Some
of the clips [do] clearly reveal the pubic areas of the young women not only as they stand on the
scale facing the camera, but also as they go through the motions required to remove all of their
clothing and put it back on." 106 Thus, the Eighth Circuit held because of where the camera was
focused, the images of the girls could not reasonably be compared to innocent family photos,
clinical depictions, or works of art. 107
In his next point, Judge Hanson distinguished that the lascivious act need not be

committed by the child, but by the alleged perpetrator. In an example, Judge Hanson applied the
Fifth Dost Factor that asks whether sexual coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity is
present. 108 According to Judge Hanson, the young women in the videos were not acting in an
obviously sexual manner, failing to find any coyness or willingness to engage in sexual
activity. 109 However, the Eighth Circuit held this does not necessarily indicate that the videos
were not lascivious. 110 In United States v. Horn, the Eighth Circuit held "'[L]ascivious exhibition
need not necessarily be 'the work of the child, whose innocence is not in question, but of the
producer or editor of the video.'" 111 Thus, even images of children acting innocently (such as the
girls in this case) can be lascivious if they are intended to be sexual. 112 Judge Hanson also noted
that all six Dost Factors do not need to be present for an image to be proscribed under § 2251. 113

105
106

/d.; See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 579 F.3d 672, 684-85 (6th Cir. 2009).

Id. at 437.
Johnson, 639 F .3d at 439.
108
/d. at 440.
109 /d.
110 Id.
111
Id., quoting Hom, 187 F.3d at 790.
112
Johnson, 639 F.3d at 439.
113
/d; Wal/enfang, 568 F.3d at 657, quoting United States v. Wolf, 890 F.2d 241,245 (lOth Cir. 1989))
(alterations omitted).
107
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According to Judge Hanson, even though three Dost Factors (a sexually suggestive setting,
inappropriate attire or unnatural poses, and a suggestion of sexual coyness) were not present in
Mr. Johnson's videos, a reasonable jury could still find that Mr. Johnson acted lasciviously. 114
For example, the fact that the camera was specifically pointed at the scale, encompassing the
minors' nude bodies from their shoulders to below their knees still weighed in favor of
lasciviousness. 115
Finally, the Eight Circuit held that statements made by the producer of the images must
be considered in determining whether the images were meant to elicit a sexual response in the
viewer. 116 For example Judge Hanson considered that "On at least one occasion after a lifter had
come out from the examination room, he [Mr. Johnson] pointedly asked the young woman (age
15-16) if she had stripped down completely." 117 Even more, when investigators asked Mr.
Johnson why he had filmed the two minors he stated that, "[H]e thought they were 'cute' and
that he was curious about what they looked like naked." 118 Mr. Johnson even admitted to police,
"[M]y pervertedness got the best of me." 119 Thus, the Eighth Circuit held a reasonable jury
could find that Mr. Johnson intended the videos to be sexual in nature and to elicit a sexual
response in the viewer. 120 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Judge Dorr and the
district court's decision to grant Mr. Johnson's motion for acquittal notwithstanding the
verdict} 21

114

/d. at 440.
/d. at 440-41; Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 832.
116
/d. at 441.
117
Johnson, 639 F.3d at 436.
118 /d.
119 /d.
120
/d. at 441; See Kemmerling, 285 F.3d at 646 (concluding that the purpose of the pictures, "appear[ed] to
be to elicit a sexual response from the viewer. These images were not designed, for instance, to provide a
clinical view of the portions of the children's anatomy that are pictured.").
115

121/d.
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III. THE DOST FACTOR TEST: A VAGUE, MISAPPLIED FACTUAL ANALYSIS
THAT PROMOTES THE SEXUALIZATION OF CHILDREN.
While the Dost Factor Test is widely implemented by different circuits and supported by
scholars, it has gathered extensive criticism regarding its vague terms, its unintentional
promotion of sexualizing children, and its misapplication among the courts. According to scholar
Steven L. Grasz, "To fully protect children from psychological and emotional harm, states
should enact legislation which restricts the production, distribution, and possession of nude
visual depictions of children." 122 The Dost Factor Test, according to Grasz, accomplishes this
goal by providing one of the clearest guides for federal courts to determine what types of
materials should be proscribed under the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation
Act. 123 Likewise, scholar James E. Bristol opines that child pornography laws, including the
Dost Factor Test, rightfully eradicate the abhorrent exploitation of children that originates from
the production of"kiddy-pom."

124

To Bristol, this test helps to diminish one of society's worst

crimes. 125 However, many scholars believe the Dost Factor Test consists of vague and confusing
language, promotes the sexualization of children, and focuses too heavily on either the content or
the context and intent behind the images. Even Bristol claims the Dost Factor Test's problems of
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visual interpretation, law application, and product accessibility allow motion pictures with illegal
depictions of children to enter the marketplace unnoticed. 126 Judges and jurors who apply this
test are often left wondering what exactly it is they are supposed to interpret. 127 With such an
immense amount of scrutiny, the Dost Factor Test must be reframed into a more coherent
structure for judges and jurors across the United States to apply.

A. Vagueness and Discrepancy in the Application of 18 U.S.C. § 2256, § 2251 and the
Dost Factor Test

Scholars have criticized the United States's anti-child pornography laws, including 18
U.S.C. § 2251, § 2256 (specifically the term "lascivious"), and the Dost Factor Test due to their
vagueness and differences in interpretation. For instance, according to 18 U.S.C. § 2256, child
pornography is defined as "any visual depiction ... of sexually explicit conduct involving a
minor." 128 However, legal scholar Allison Cochran explains this language leaves a lot of grey
area.

129

Because this definition requires the depicted minor to be engaged in sexual activity,

Cochran asks, "What about a minor just standing in a picture in their underclothes or even
naked? 130 Is that really 'sexually explicit?'" 131 Cochran also asks, "What about one teen taking a
picture of themselves engaged in some sort of sexual activity, then they send it out to their
friends or post it on a blog, are they guilty of child pornography? 132 Clearly, § 2256 lacks any
indication of how the courts should interpret its language.
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Critics also find § 2251 problematic because it is unclear what the term "lascivious"
under § 2256 describes, resulting in the inconsistent application of § 2251 against alleged
offenders. As Bristol explains, photographs of nude, partially nude, or fully clothed children
create quasi-legal scenarios, with the deciding factor being whether a child's body was portrayed
with lascivious intent. 133 However, Bristol raises the question of what, exactly, "lascivious"
describes. 134 To Bristol the word "lascivious" could describe the child, the child's act, the
filmmaker's intent, or even the viewer's reaction. 135 Even worse, the circuit courts' inconsistent
applications of § 2251 and the term "lascivious" offer little guidance into the meaning of the
statute. For example, Bristol notes the court in United States v. Kimmerling ruled a picture is
"lascivious" only when it is sexual in nature.

136

Thus, § 2251 is violated when a picture

illustrates a child nude, partially clothed, or when the focus of the image is the child's pubic
area. 137 However, Bristol also notes in New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court took a different
stance, holding that images must "visually depict sexual conduct by children" in order to be
"lascivious," and prohibited under § 2251. 138 In United States v. Knox, Solicitor General Drew
Days made a similar argument, claiming "lascivious" must mean that the child is depicted as
lusciously engaging in sexual conduct. 139 Adding even further discrepancy, the Third Circuit
disagreed with Days, holding "lascivious" has nothing to do with the actions of the child, but
centers on whether the photographs serve to satisfy the sexual cravings of a voyeur. 140 Bristol
demonstrates that in applying § 2251 one is left to ponder whether "lascivious" describes the
133
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child (as held in Kimmerling), the conduct of the child (as held in Ferber and argued by Days in
Knox), or the filmmaker's intent (as held in Knox). 141 Such inconsistencies among the courts in

defining "lasciviousness" demonstrate the need for the circuits to adopt a more cohesive and
reliable standard for proscribing child pornography and finding persons guilty under § 2251.
Finally, the Dost Factor Test's vague terms, coupled with each trier of fact's unique life
experiences, make it nearly impossible to create a universal fact intensive test for lascivious
images. Bristol raises the question; can a depiction be lascivious based upon the factors outlined
in United States v. Dost?

142

According to scholar Anne Higonnet, this question cannot be

answered, because ineffective word choice within the Dost Factor Test allows interpretations of
the word "lascivious"' to shift. 143 For example, Bristol asks, what are the precise meanings of
the Dost Factor Test's terms, "sexually suggestive," "sexual coyness," and "designed to elicit
sexual response in the viewer?" 144 Because such terms are open to multiple interpretations by
the courts, it is no wonder the district court and court of appeals in United States v. Johnson drew
such different conclusions regarding the lasciviousness of Mr. Johnson's videos.
In addition, the application of the Dost Test Factors may differ based upon a juror's
unique life experiences.

As Bristol opines, while some laws enjoy clarity and precision,

interpreting images of children may never be ascribed these attributes. 145 Whether a filmmaker,
the public, or triers-of-fact, each individual will interpret from a sitz im Ieben, or a situation in
life.
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religious beliefs will only complicate one's interpretation. 147 Thus, the vagueness of the Dost
Factor Test's terms and each trier of fact's unique interpretation of such terms illustrate the need
to adopt a more coherent test to identify "lascivious" images.
B. The Dost Factor Test-A Sexualizer of Children (start here)
Many scholars find the Dost Factor Test ineffective because society embraces the
sexualization of children in the marketplace and the Dost Factor Test itself encourages the
sexualization of children. First, scholars claim the sexualization of children in society makes it
difficult to determine an objective test that can differentiate between lascivious and nonlascivious content involving children. As Anne Higonnet opines, "[E]roticism in mainstream
images of children... [and] sexualization of childhood is not a fringe phenomenon inflicted by
perverts on a protesting society, but a fundamental change furthered by legitimate industries and
millions of satisfied customers." 148 Higonnet asserts that children's bodies advertise a plethora
of society's products, including swimsuits, fragrances, clothing, electronics, and other
commodities. 149 Reason being, as Higonnet explains, "[E]very industry based on the display of
adult bodies spawns a juvenile counterpart." tso In fact, Bristol notes that the clothing line
Abercrombie began selling its catalogue, because the provocative photos of its teenage models
were so successful that the images became the commodity. ISI In another example of sexualizing
children, Bristol describes how southern United States citizens are infatuated with child beauty
pageants. 1s2 Bristol states, "Little girls-some as young as three- and four-years-old- are judged
based solely upon appearance of makeup, hairstyle, and outfit-either bathing suit or evening
147
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gown." 153 This sexualization of children can make interpreting the Dost Factor Test difficult,
allowing suspect depictions of children to go unnoticed and innocent and valuable depictions to
be censored. 154
Second, several critics claim the Dost Factor Test itself contributes to the sexualization of
children. According to scholar Amy Adler, the Dost Factor Test requires one to "evaluate the
lasciviousness of the photographer and an 'audience that consists of himself or like-minded
pedophiles."' 155 Essentially, the court or juror must focus on the photographer's peculiar lust
and take on the gaze of the pedophile in order to flush out pictures of children that have
pedophilic appeal.
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To Adler, this requirement under the Dost Factor Test creates the

daunting interpretive difficulty for society to ascertain a pedophile's exact intent, even the intent
of a necrophilic. 157 For example, Scholar Robert J. Danay illustrates how the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals in United States v. Knox used its own pedophilic gaze to hold that an image could
constitute "lascivious exhibition of the genitals" even if the child wore clothes. 158 The Dost
Factor Test required the Third Circuit to carefully, explicitly, and publicly scrutinize the genital
and pubic regions of clothed minors in an effort to reveal a picture's sexually stimulating
nature. 159 To Danay, this test wrongfully places a "sexual child on public display while
simultaneously condemning those who view children in such a manner." 160 Through cases such
as Knox and Dost, Danay states, the American courts have become "unwitting cultural conduits
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and amplifiers," to the concept of children being sexual objects. 161 Thus, to Danay, this flawed
process of extinguishing child pornography is part of the reason society can never fully eliminate
the problem of child pornography. 162
C. The Dost Factor Test- All Image and No Intent or All Intent and No Image?
Critics also assert that courts applying the Dost Factor Test rely too heavily on either the
content or the intent and context of the image in deciding whether § 2251 has been violated. On
one hand, many critics claim judges and/or juries that rely too heavily upon content based Dost
Factors in their analysis fail to consider the pedophile who fulfills his perverse intentions with
innocuous images of minors. For example, Adler explains the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
misapplied the Dost Factor Test in United State v. Villard by holding that child pornography
inheres in a photo.

163

Similarly, the First Circuit in United States v. Amirault ruled it is

unacceptable for the court to analyze beyond the four corners of a photograph, because "a
deviant's subjective response could turn innocuous images into pornography." 164 However,
scholars find a problem with this approach. As Danay explains, the sexual naivete of a depicted
child could be the arousing factor for pedophiles.

165

For example, according to Danay, "a recent

survey involving members of the North American Man Boy Love Association (NAMBLA), an
organization for pedophiles, revealed that its members derived erotic stimulation through
watching 'children on network television, the Disney Channel, and mainstream films. '" 166 Such
evidence illustrates the limited scope a "content only" application of the Dost Factor Test has in
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prosecuting those with perverse intentions against children.
On the other hand, there are scholars claiming judges and/or juries that focus too heavily
on intent or context based Dost Factors wrongfully disregard the content of the image, embrace
society's captivation of naked children, and rule from the perspective of the pedophile. First,
Bristol notes that there is a trend for grand juries and courts to not seem bothered by the actual
content of the photos. 167 In fact, nude portrayals of children date back to the classics age, where
children were depicted in Greek statues and Renaissance paintings. 168 According to Bristol,
"[P]eople are not bothered [by the content of such images] because they've been fascinated by
the content for centuries." 169 Second, as Adler explains, child pornography laws focus on the
perspective of the pedophile, which can be problematic, because pedophiles can have many

°

preferences and not all child nudity is the same. 17 For example, in United States v. Moore, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed photographs of two young boys naked in the
Australian wilderness. 171 One photograph depicted a boy walking across a stream, while the
other showed a boy climbing a tree.
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Although the court found that neither photo "appears to

depict sexual activity or sexuality," the court still concluded that the pictures seemed "designed
to provoke a sexual response." 173 Using this case, Adler asserts that when viewed from the
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perspective of pedophiles, all photos of children could be erotic in one way or another. 174 Thus,
an intent centered application of the Dost Factor Test can lead to an exclusion of images that
would not be considered lascivious had each image's content also been reviewed.

D. Suggestions from Scholars to Reform the Current Anti Child Pornography Laws:
While scholars have proposed a "harm analysis" test and an "incitement" test to reform
America's anti child pornography laws, each proposed remedy is an unrealistic suggestion to fix
the current problems of America's child pornography laws. Under the first suggested reform, the
"harm analysis" test, scholar Bruce Ryder recommends prohibiting the possession of materials
containing images of children if the images caused "harm" to children in their production. 175
Under this approach, child pornography should be limited to materials where children engage in
"explicit sex acts." 176 Ryder opines this "harm analysis" test would refocus judicial attention,
not on hidden prurient qualities inherent in particular impugned materials, but on the express
advocacy of harm, sexual or otherwise, to children. 177 Proponents also assert this reform would
remind courts that child pornography laws are designed to prevent actual harm to children, not to
conduct an analysis that may hazily send the message that sex with children can be pursued. 178
However, critics of the "harm analysis" test such as scholar James Marsh stress that this reform
disregards the concept that child pornography in and of itself causes personal injury to the child
involved. 179 For example, the court in New York v. Ferber noted, "A child who has posed for a
camera must go through life knowing that the recording is circulating within the mass
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distribution system for child pornography." 180 According to the Supreme Court, the fear of
exposure and the tension of keeping the images secret have profound emotional repercussions
upon children.

181

Moreover, scholar Debra Burke states there is substantial social evidence that

persons who molest minors use such images as a tool not only to arouse predatory lust, but also
to seduce children. 182 Under Ryder's proposed test, pedophiles would be allowed to keep for
their own perversion images that fall short of causing what Ryder defines as "harm" to children.

Under the second suggested reform, the "incitement" test, Burke calls for courts to
evaluate the context of a situation in order to determine if an incitement to imminent lawless
activity exists (similar to Justice Brandenburg's incitement formula).

183

Explaining the proposed

incitement test, Burke states "[W]hile it is unlikely that a mother who shows a picture taken of
her child in the bathtub to a sister would be held accountable, a commercial provider of sexually
explicit speech to a foreseeable pedophilic audience likely would be held accountable," due to its
prospect of inciting imminent lawlessness. 184 However, even Burke is quick to explain that this
approach does not fix all of the child pornography law issues. 185 Burke explains that under the
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incitement test, "there is still no controlling for pedophiles, who are aroused by the photos of
children clad in underwear in clothing catalogues." 186 Even more, the creation of virtual child
pornography has only blurred the line dividing protected free speech and permissible
regulation. 187 Today's circuits are split on whether virtual child pornography is merely an
innocuous invention of the mind or a real threat to the safety and security of a child. 188 Thus, the
implementation of an incitement test, similar to that suggested by Justice Brandenburg in
defining obscenity, may not be enough to quash the ever-expanding world of child pornography.

IV. BRINGING A TRUE BALANCE OF CONTENT AND CONTEXT TO THE DOST
FACTOR TEST.
A. The Western District of Missouri and Eighth Circuit's Misapplication of the Dost
Factor Test in United States v. Johnson
The misapplication of the Dost Factor Test by favoring only content based factors or only
intent and context based factors has lead to discrepancies among the different circuits. The
conflicting decisions by the Western District Court of Missouri and the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Johnson demonstrate that the Dost Factor Test is ineffective in
proscribing lascivious images of children. Judge Dorr of the district court chose to focus his
entire Dost Factor Test analysis upon the content of the images, thus overturning the jury's
conviction of Mr. Johnson on all eight violations of§ 2251. 189 However, Judge Hanson and the
court of appeals explains that while nearly all the videos of the victims did not film a child's
pubic region, such images would have been captured on film if the child had merely turned to
face the camera} 90 Based on the camera's angle and testimony of Mr. Johnson, Judge Hanson
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opined that the defendant's sexual intent made the images lascivious, even if the images were
unable to meet certain content based factors.
B. The New Dost Factor Test Would Require Both the Content of an Image and
Context in Which the Image was Created to be Assessed in Determining
Lasciviousness
A novel suggestion to create a sense of uniformity in implementing the Dost Factor Test
is to require that a mandatory balance of both content based and context based Dost Factors be
analyzed and present in order to proscribe an image under §2251. This new provision to the
current Dost Factor Test will accomplish three goals. First it will insulate the Dost Factor Test
analysis from the emotions of jurors and judges, who wish to apply only those factors that suit
their predispositions. Second, the new Dost Factor Test will remain organic as technology and
child pornography change over time. Third, it will allow courts to form distinct categories of
images that are lascivious and proscribed under § 2251.
First, the New Dost Factor Test will insulate the application of the law from the high
emotions that often accompany child pornography cases. Requiring that both the content and
context of each image be analyzed and that both content and context based factors be present for
an image to be lascivious will restrict a judge or juror from applying only those factors that suit
his or her feelings toward the defendant. Had these amendments existed during United States v.
Johnson, the Eighth Circuit would have been required to show, not only that Mr. Johnson had a

sexual intent (based upon the camera angle and testimony), but also that the image contained
proscribed content. Despite these new requirements creating a higher standard for prosecution,
the newly proposed rule offers an extra level of assurance that the images were properly
proscribed or accepted.

28
Second, these new requirements for both content based and context based factors can
fluctuate in meaning based upon society's standards of decency toward children.

Today,

children are openly accepted as models in clothing lines and even arguably as sex symbols in the
music industry. These are common occurrences that only a few decades ago were considered
inappropriate. For such reasons, it would be nearly impossible to reform the Dost Factor Test to
contain completely objective factors with timeless interpretations. Instead, implementing this
new requirement will still allow the application of different Dost Factors to mold to society's
norms as time progresses. For example, if the Dost Factor test is being applied to analyze the
potential lasciviousness of an image, the content based factors of "sexual coyness" or "sexually
suggestive" may be selected by the judge to create a balance with the intent based factors he or
she also selects.

Critically though, the definition of what constitutes "sexual coyness" or

"sexual suggestiveness" will be allowed to change as America's culture changes. The new Dost
Factor Test will never be outdated to assess potentially lascivious images. Even more, the new
Dost Factor Test's adaptability will allow it to be applicable to new technology, such as virtual
child pornography. Finally, the current Dost Factor test is non-exhaustive, with judges free to
add and eliminate factors in their analysis, as they deem necessary} 91 This principle would
remain intact under the new Dost Factor Test. However, under the new rule, there must always
remain a balance between factors analyzing the content and factors analyzing the context of the
images.
Finally, these new requirements for the Dost Factor Test will gradually establish defined
categories of lascivious images. The freedom that courts are given in selecting which Dost
Factor to apply have lead to inconsistent rulings, as seen in United States v. Johnson. Such
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decisions keep the public from understanding the meaning of "lascivious" and thus,
understanding what types of images constitute sexually explicit conduct under § 2251. However,
with the circuit's consistent implementation of a set of both context and content-based factors,
patterns of lascivious images will develop over time.

These patterns allow the public to

understand what sorts of images cross the threshold into the territory of child pornography, even
before the images are created.

Now, photographers and videographers will have a better

understanding as to whether their proposed images will likely be considered a violation of§
2251. Even more, such knowledge will tum the Dost Factor Test into a preventative measure
against the sexual exploitation of children, rather than simply a retroactive test to assess the harm
that has already damaged a child.
This new standard for the Dost Test, while perhaps more rigid than its current standard,
will still allow for great flexibly as societal and cultural norms change over time. In addition, a
more rigid test will help to establish a uniform definition of the term "lascivious" during the time
period in which the Dost Factor Test is applied. Finally, these reforms will serve to not only
enhance the protection of children, but also to prevent the convictions of those are in fact
innocent of any violation under § 2251.

